The ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’ — The new UK government’s ASEAN-UK Dialogue Partnership inheritance
The ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’ — the new UK government’s
ASEAN-UK Dialogue Partnership inheritance
WRITTEN BY DR SHINGO NAGATA
3 September 2024
The UK’s general election on 4 July resulted in the Conservative Party relinquishing its 14-year reign to the Labour Party. After coming to power in 2010, the Conservative government embarked on a ‘return to east of the Suez’ in its policy toward the Indo-Pacific region, later conceptualised as the ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’. Will the new Labour government seek to revise this inherited Indo-Pacific policy?
Under the Conservative government, the UK deepened its defence and security cooperation with Japan, Australia, and South Korea, as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states. In the March 2021 Integrated Review (IR21), the UK’s defence and security strategy policy paper, the ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’ was placed at the centre of the post-Brexit foreign policy referred to as ‘Global Britain’. This document was later revised in the Integrated Review Refresh 2023 (IRR), following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, in which the Indo-Pacific as the geopolitical centre of gravity in the world remained a high priority and “a permanent pillar of UK international policy”.
Given the significant role of the military in foreign policy within Southeast Asian countries, military-to-military relations are important for diplomacy in the region. Accordingly, the UK has traditionally emphasised defence diplomacy and cultivated military-to-military ties with ASEAN states.
The incumbent Labour government has stated that a new strategic review will be released in the first half of 2025. In this context, British media has reported on the possible cancellation of the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), a joint fighter development programme between the UK, Japan, and Italy — a pillar of the ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’. However, cooperation on the GCAP was confirmed at the Trilateral Defence Ministers’ Meeting on 23 July 2024 in London, and the new Labour government stated that it would follow through with the deployment of an aircraft carrier strike group to the Indo-Pacific in 2025, as revealed in May 2023. Although a radical review of the ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’ seems unlikely, it is important to examine how the Labour government will adopt the Indo-Pacific approach it has inherited from the Conservative government.
ASEAN-UK dialogue partnership: a legacy of the ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’
The relationship with ASEAN has been one of the pillars of the ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’. Since the late 1970s, ASEAN has strengthened its role as a multilateral forum through dialogue partnerships with extra-regional powers. It played a crucial role in shaping the regional order in the Asia-Pacific in the 1990s and has become the Indo-Pacific region’s geopolitical centre of gravity in the era of great power competition. The UK has historically maintained close ties with Southeast Asia, especially three of the ten ASEAN member states– Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei–which are also members of the Commonwealth of Nations.
The Conservative government consistently emphasised the need to strengthen relations with ASEAN in the ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’. The UK applied to become an ASEAN dialogue partner in June 2020 and was recognised as ASEAN’s 11th extra-regional dialogue partner in August 2021. In August 2022, the Plan of Action (POA) to Implement the ASEAN-UK Dialogue Partnership (2022-2026) was formulated, agreeing on the areas and direction of cooperation between the UK and ASEAN for the next five years. On 26 July 2024, the new Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Affairs David Lammy attended the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) 10+1. The ASEAN-UK Joint Statement released at this conference was meant to confirm the progress of the POA and was a sign of Labour’s commitment to the success of the ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’.
As the POA’s content shows, the areas of UK-ASEAN cooperation are extensive. Even after withdrawing from the Middle East and Southeast Asia in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the UK has maintained a long-term military presence in Southeast Asia. The UK established the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) — a framework for defence cooperation between the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore — in November 1971, and has maintained the British Force Brunei (BFB) since Brunei’s independence in January 1984. British military presence has contributed to peace and security in Southeast Asia by enabling the rapid formation and deployment of the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) in September 1999. Against these backgrounds, defence and security cooperation with regional countries has been a top priority in the ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’.
Why the UK wants to get involved in ADMM-Plus
The UK, along with France, Canada, and the EU, has applied for observer status in the Experts’ Working Groups (EWGs) of the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) since 2018. ADMM-Plus is a meeting of the ten ASEAN states and eight dialogue partners (Japan, the US, China, India, Russia, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand). It is characterised by the seven EWGs in non-traditional security areas through which dialogue partners assist member states in capacity building. Initially, applications by the UK, France, and others for observer status were blocked by opposition from China and Russia. However, ASEAN, which does not appreciate interference from China and Russia, revised its terms of reference in 2021. In November 2022, observer status was granted to the UK, France, and Canada.
Having secured external dialogue partner status, the UK is now seeking full membership of the ADMM-Plus. The IRR of 2023 showcases the UK’s intention to participate in the ADMM-Plus in addition to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and it has formally applied for full membership in the ADMM-Plus in March 2023. Why does the UK want to be involved in the ADMM-Plus?
Given the significant role of the military in foreign policy within Southeast Asian countries, military-to-military relations are important for diplomacy in the region. Accordingly, the UK has traditionally emphasised defence diplomacy and cultivated military-to-military ties with ASEAN states. For example, in 2016, it established the Singapore-based British Defence Staff Southeast Asia, a network of Defence Attaché based in the region. The UK’s application for ADMM-Plus membership is an extension of these efforts.
ASEAN also promotes defence cooperation with dialogue partners through the ADMM-Plus. Between 2018 and 2023, joint ‘ASEAN+1’ style maritime and naval exercises were conducted with China, the US, Russia, and India respectively. From 2021 to 2023, the UK participated in just under 40 exercises with Southeast Asian countries, only about a third of the exercises Japan and Australia conducted with Southeast Asian countries in the same period. Membership of ADMM-Plus could provide the UK opportunities to conduct standalone joint exercises with ASEAN, enabling the British armed forces to strengthen the relationship with their ASEAN member state counterparts.
To enhance political status in the Indo-Pacific
In the political sphere, ADMM-Plus membership could be a stepping stone to joining the East Asia Summit (EAS) — one of the most important multilateral forums in the Asia-Pacific region. Notably, ADMM-Plus and EAS have an identical roster of members. In 2010, the US became a member of the EAS to show a deeper commitment to Asia-Pacific affairs. Likewise, the UK’s pursuit of EAS membership reflects its strategic intent to amplify its influence and political presence in the region.
On the other hand, other European countries have also increased their engagement in the Indo-Pacific in recent years, with France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands already establishing themselves as development partners with ASEAN. During the APEC leaders’ meeting in November 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron expressed interest in the ASEAN dialogue partner status to expand its role in the region. France, with its extensive overseas territories in the Indo-Pacific region, sees itself as an Indo-Pacific power. If it succeeds in obtaining an ASEAN dialogue partnership, other countries may follow suit.
In view of this, the Labour government should proactively inherit the 'Indo-Pacific tilt', a legacy of the Conservative government. By preserving the UK's leading position in relations with ASEAN, the UK could encourage increased European engagement with ASEAN. Furthermore, such a position could also offer opportunities for the Labour government to improve relations with European countries strained by Brexit, another legacy of the Conservative government.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Dr Shingo Nagata is a visiting researcher at the Institute of Human and Social Sciences, Kanazawa University, Japan. He also serves as an editorial board member of the Japan Society of Strategic Studies. Image credit: Unsplash/David Dibert.