Thailand’s upcoming general election: A preview
Thailand’s upcoming general election:
a preview
WRITTEN BY KEN MATHIS LOHATEPANONT
14 March 2023
This year, Thailand will hold its second general election since the 2014 military coup. Like in 2019, this election will also be held under the auspices of the 2017 Constitution, which allows the unelected Senate and the elected House of Representatives to jointly appoint a prime minister. Unlike in 2019, however, Thailand’s switch to a new majoritarian electoral system in 2022 will favour larger parties. Therefore, the stage is set for a clash between the larger conservative parties that can amass the Senate’s support, and the opposition parties that hope to make sufficient electoral gains to prevent the Senate from being involved in selecting the next prime minister.
For Thailand’s voters, this election will be marked by three key issues: first, the blurring of ideological lines (which had also been an issue that was markedly clear during the 2019 election); second, economic issues that continue to linger as the country recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic; and third, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha’s play for another term after already being in power for eight years.
The blurring of ideological divisions
This general election follows a series of events that have significantly altered Thailand’s political landscape. Prime Minister Prayut’s temporary suspension due to questions over whether or not he breached the prime ministerial term limit did not prove fatal to his political prospects, but it briefly ceded the limelight to his deputy (and long-time ally since their days together in the military) Prawit Wongsuwan, who became acting prime minister while Prayut remained suspended. Now, it is apparent that there is a rift between the two, with Prawit running as the prime ministerial candidate of the ruling Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP), while Prayut has chosen to stand with the new United Thai Nation Party (UTN) — his new vehicle for power.
This development is significant for several reasons. First, it demonstrates that there is no longer a united front for Thai conservatives like there was in 2019, due in part to the fact that they now have a wide array of conservative parties from which to pick. The UTN appears much more ideologically conservative in nature, having attracted several conservative ideologues to form the party’s core leadership. However, its electoral strength is still unknown. On the other hand, the PPRP — a big tent party composed of local ‘bigwigs’, technocrats, and former opposition members — still retains significant local networks and patronage systems.
The blurring of the lines between the government and the opposition means that voters may very well end up with a government that straddles Thailand’s traditional divides.
While weakened, these networks are still a force to be reckoned with. The once-influential Democrat Party appears to be a spent force, having lost many of its members to other conservative parties. They appear poised to be eclipsed by the Bhumjaithai Party, which made waves during the last election by campaigning on marijuana legalisation and making good on that promise. Campaigning on its newfound reputation for delivering on policy pledges, it is now making a serious play to move up from a junior coalition partner to a dominant force in the next government.
At the same time, the rupture between Prayut and Prawit has also blurred clear ideological boundaries between the pro-regime parties (such as Palang Pracharath) and the opposition parties (such as Pheu Thai). In 2019, voters were asked to choose between supporting the continuation of the Prayut regime or casting a vote of no confidence against the system. This time around, there are rumours around the opposition Pheu Thai Party, claiming that while its de facto party leader (and the former prime minister) Thaksin Shinawatra remains in self-imposed exile abroad, he is keen to make a deal with the PPRP. Prawit is reputed to be more inclined towards deal-making than Prayut, and as the recalcitrant junta-appointed Senate remains an obstacle to Pheu Thai’s hopes of returning to Government House, a coalition with the PPRP likely remains Pheu Thai’s best hope of attaining power. It is possible that voters may elect a Pheu Thai government, only to find Prawit at its head.
Pheu Thai has vehemently denied this rumour, but if such a move were to materialise, it would isolate the progressive Move Forward Party, which has made the rejection of the Prayut regime the centrepiece of its platform. This places the party in direct opposition to the conservative UTN. However, neither of these parties is likely to end up as the largest party in parliament. Instead, the blurring of the lines between the government and the opposition means that voters may very well end up with a government that straddles Thailand’s traditional divides.
Bread-and-butter issues dominate
Beyond questions of ideology and political values, economic issues are also dominating the public debate. This is no surprise — after a six per cent economic contraction in 2020, post-COVID recovery has been fragile, and high inflation last year took a big toll on people’s pocketbooks.
As such, political parties have been racing to unveil the ‘flashiest’ economic policies. For example, Pheu Thai has pledged to raise the minimum wage to 600 baht from the current rate of 328-354 baht within the next four years, while Thaksin has stated that this figure could reach 800 baht. The Move Forward Party has promised to instantly increase the minimum wage to 450 baht, while highlighting a variety of policies intended to strengthen Thailand’s welfare state.
On the other hand, the PPRP has pledged to increase the monthly allowance available to state welfare card holders, which is around 11 million people, from 200-300 baht to 700 baht a month. It is notable that the PPRP chose this figure, since — although the number applies to completely different policies, one being the minimum wage and the other being the state welfare card — it has allowed Prawit (whose nickname is Pom) to campaign as ‘Pom 700’. Prawit’s hope is that the headline figure of 700, being higher than Pheu Thai’s key figure of 600, will draw in voters. Yet even Prawit’s cleverly designed pledge now risks being overshadowed by Prayut, who recently said his party would raise the allowance to 1,000 baht.
A referendum on Prayut’s tenure
Above all, this election will be another referendum on Prayut’s tenure. Although the Constitutional Court ruled that Prayut has not yet breached the eight-year term limit for prime ministers, it has granted him only two more years to serve. For his part, Prayut has pledged that he will use his remaining two years to “transform” Thailand.
In the middle of last year, Prayut announced a three-pronged economic strategy: constructing more infrastructure, turning Thailand into a global hub for the production of electric vehicles, and ensuring greater ease of access to banking services and credit. At the time, he promised that it would take two years for this strategy to bear fruit, setting up the rationale for his continuation in office. Whether or not this will prove an effective ‘sales pitch’ is debatable. Prayut’s supporters will be thrilled that he has a shot at staying in the political fray, while his opponents are certain to ask what he will be able to accomplish in two years that he could not over the last eight.
Another question is whether or not Prayut himself will actually be an effective campaigner. Despite spending eight years in government, his exposure to electoral politics has been limited. He spent the first half of his tenure as an absolutist junta leader, and although he was nominated as the prime minister by the PPRP in 2019, he did not join the party and participated in only one campaign event. This time around, Prayut has decided not only to become a full-fledged member of the UTN but also to run as an MP. Whether or not his fiery temperament will be a good fit for the rough and tumble of a Thai election campaign remains to be seen.
The most interesting factor, however, may not lie with Prayut’s prospects with the wider electorate, but rather with the narrower selectorate of Senators that will play a key role in choosing the next prime minister. In 2019, the Senate voted for Prayut unanimously. In this election, however, with more potential conservative prime ministerial candidates to choose from — including Prawit and Anutin Charnvirakul, who lead the Bhumjaithai Party — how will the Senate act? Should the UTN’s election campaign falter and Prayut enter the House with a disappointing number of supporting MPs, is it possible that he could be outfoxed by his politically savvier rivals?
Even if that happens, Prayut may be saved by his key rival — Pheu Thai’s prime ministerial candidate and Thaksin’s daughter, Paethongtharn Shinawatra. Thaksin remains a ‘lightning rod’ for the conservative furore, and few of Prayut’s allies will be thrilled to see another Shinawatra in the prime minister’s seat. That could be sufficient for both anti-Thaksin voters and Senators alike to come together and ensure that Prayut gets his two more years as prime minister.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Ken Mathis Lohatepanont is a PhD student at the University of Michigan’s Department of Political Science. Image credit: World Travel & Tourism Council/Wikimedia.