Sanctions are just one part of the puzzle to stopping Myanmar’s military
Sanctions are just one part of the puzzle to stopping Myanmar’s military
WRITTEN BY HUNTER MARSTON
17 January 2025
Despite increased nationwide resistance and targeted Western sanctions, Myanmar’s State Administration Council (SAC) junta has rejected calls for dialogue with the exiled National Unity Government and doubled down on its campaign to bomb its way out of the current morass. Military airstrikes have killed 540 civilians between January and October 2024, with 350 attacks alone in August — the highest monthly number since the February 2021 coup.
Western sanctions, previously imposed on Myanmar from 1988 to 2016 with lacklustre results, have failed to deter the military’s ongoing atrocities. Targeted sanctions have made it marginally more difficult for the military to acquire aviation fuel for its aerial bombardment of resistance forces around the country. However, the sanctions have failed to alter the regime’s calculus or willingness to commit mass atrocities to remain in power.
Previous sanctions targeting the Myanma Foreign Trade Bank and Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank constrained the SAC’s ability to access foreign currency reserves that the military had used to import arms. But the generals quickly found workarounds, creating shell companies or utilising other banks, such as the Myanma Economic Bank.
This does not mean sanctions are completely misguided. But the problem is that sanctions often become untethered from realistic goals, such as making it more difficult for the military to procure the weapons or aviation fuel it needs to sustain its counterinsurgency. While sanctions alone are unlikely to change the military’s behaviour, they are more likely to be effective when part of a broader diplomatic strategy, which is required to resolve the current crisis.
Western governments often link rhetoric around sanctions to vague policy goals including restoring democracy or supporting the people of Myanmar, leading to mission creep and confusion around the efficacy of sanctions in achieving their desired end states.
While sanctions alone are unlikely to change the military’s behaviour, they are more likely to be effective when part of a broader diplomatic strategy, which is required to resolve the current crisis.
In October 2024, when the United Kingdom, European Union and Canada announced their latest round of sanctions on entities facilitating the Myanmar military’s supply of jet fuel and aircraft technology, the UK Minister for the Indo-Pacific explained that these latest sanctions were aimed at ‘further constraining the military’s access to funds, equipment and resources’. A spokesperson for the US Treasury Department claimed that US sanctions imposed on several individuals and entities in August 2023 would ‘further deprive the regime of the resources that enable it to oppress its citizens’. Still, the military continues to bomb civilians indiscriminately.
There are few appealing alternatives available to Western governments short of secondary sanctions on third parties, such as Chinese, Russian or Singaporean firms that do business with the Myanmar military. Yet the efforts of international rights activists and monitoring groups to shed light on foreign governments and businesses facilitating the military’s weapons purchases have been surprisingly effective in driving policy change.
After a 2023 UN report revealed that Singapore-based companies were responsible for the sale of USD 254 million in military equipment to the SAC since the 2021 coup, Singapore’s government launched an investigation into the country’s business ties to the Myanmar military. It also approved Singaporean bank UOB’s decision to cut off services for Myanmar-based accounts.
While information campaigns are likely to be less successful in motivating policy change in more authoritarian partners like China or Thailand, that should not discourage non-governmental organisations and researchers already active on this front. Their work may have influence behind the scenes, even in countries like Thailand with stark political divisions.
Former Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin’s government signalled it was considering an alternative approach to Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis by proposing a humanitarian safe zone in early 2024. In December, the new Pheu Thai government under Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra actively pushed for a diplomatic solution to the conflict. Bangkok held informal talks involving the Myanmar junta’s Minister for Foreign Affairs Than Swe and representatives from China, India and Bangladesh, alongside separate talks including neighbouring Southeast Asian states.
Although sanctions have failed to meet the unrealistic goal of forcing Myanmar’s junta to end the conflict and restore democracy, they are not entirely misguided. Targeted sanctions have raised the reputational costs of doing business with the military and prompted modest policy shifts by third-party states to isolate the generals.
But a comprehensive diplomatic strategy is required to convince the SAC that continued military rule is not in the country’s long-term interests and the junta must negotiate with the resistance to end the conflict.
Such a strategy would leverage the resources of a more diverse set of actors, including the media, human rights activists and civil society groups helping to shine a light on the SAC’s illicit business networks. Diplomats and governments must complement targeted financial sanctions with concerted efforts to build coalitions capable of confronting the Myanmar military junta and convincing it to step back from the brink.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Hunter Marston is a PhD Candidate in International Relations at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, The Australian National University, Southeast Asia Associate at 9DASHLINE and Adjunct Research Fellow at La Trobe University. Image credit: Pexels/Gu Bra.