Political dealmaking will be key in Thailand’s upcoming election

WRITTEN BY NAPON JATUSRIPITAK AND KEN MATHIS LOHATEPANONT

13 April 2023

With Thailand’s House of Representatives dissolved and the next general election scheduled for 14 May 2023, the country’s political parties are competing to outdo each other with populist policy pledges.

In a bid to bring about the first transition of power in nearly a decade, Pheu Thai has vowed to double daily minimum wages to 600 baht (about USD 17.50) by 2027. In response, Palang Pracharath (PPRP) has pledged to raise the state welfare card scheme monthly allowance from 600 to 700 baht. The Prayut-led United Thai Nation Party (UTN) has promised to raise this allowance even higher, to 1,000 baht (about USD 29). More recently, Pheu Thai announced that it will distribute 10,000 baht (about USD 292) via a digital wallet to every Thai over the age of 16. Essentially, these moves have created the widespread impression that parties are competing for votes primarily by offering more money.

While Thai voters can influence the parties’ relative electoral performance, voters’ preferences may not be reflected in the post-election coalition configurations.

This turn of events demonstrates how the model that former Prime Minister (PM) Thaksin Shinawatra pioneered over two decades ago — economic populism — has become a standard practice across all the political parties. Yet, policies alone will not determine the winner of the 14 May election nor will the policies implemented by the post-election government necessarily align with what political parties have proposed. Instead, backroom political dealmaking will play a pivotal role in solving the conundrum of which party will lead the next government.

Even a majority will not guarantee Pheu Thai the government

Only one party, Pheu Thai, has a credible chance of gaining a majority in the 500-member House. But among the major parties, it is least likely to lead in forming a viable governing coalition. In a political landscape where the unelected 250-member Senate, which voted en masse for General Prayut in 2019, will join 500 MPs in selecting a new PM, even a Pheu Thai majority would not guarantee that it can assemble a working coalition. This is mainly because the Senate is unlikely to support a PM candidate running under Pheu Thai’s banner. Since the Senate was handpicked by a committee that consisted of individuals loyal to General Prawit Wongsuwon (PPRP) and General Prayut Chan-ocha (UTN), it stands against most of the parties in the current opposition and Pheu Thai, most of all, due to its association with the Shinawatras.

To secure at least 376 out of 750 votes in parliament, politicians across the political spectrum must form makeshift alliances, setting aside policy priorities and ideological differences in marriages of convenience. This trend is already foreshadowed by large-scale party hopping and the blurring of ideological divisions among major Thai parties.

Thailand’s future public policy trajectory will therefore depend heavily on the characteristics of the post-electoral coalition government, whose composition will likely be subject to the whims of political dealmakers. While Thai voters can influence the parties’ relative electoral performance, voters’ preferences may not be reflected in the post-election coalition configurations.

Possible post-election scenarios

We predict that three scenarios are plausible: a ‘status quo’ scenario, where an amalgamation of conservative-leaning, pragmatic, and small parties from the current government reassemble a ‘new’ government; an ‘opposition landslide’ outcome, that swaps the current government for the opposition; or ‘a political crossover’ where key parties from the current government and the opposition team up to form a new ‘national reconciliation’ government.

The first scenario would be the continuation of the status quo in which a conservative-leaning government is formed, led by General Prayut or General Prawit as PM with support from the UTN, PPRP, Bhumjaithai (BJT), Democrat Party, and smaller parties, with full backing from the Senate. Like before, most parties would be unlikely to implement their policy promises due to coalitional and factional infighting. Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC) projects that are already underway will likely continue without disruption. However, with the BJT as the largest party in such a coalition, the real policy centrepieces of the next government may involve implementing regulations on cannabis and settling ongoing disputes regarding the construction of the Orange Line’s western extension.

The second possibility is an opposition landslide. In the unlikely scenario that Pheu Thai wins by a landslide, effectively shutting down the Senate’s vote, either real-estate mogul Srettha Thavisin or Thaksin's daughter Paethongtharn Shinawatra are likely to be PM. The liberal-leaning cabinet would consist of a mix of business and technocratic elites with ties to the Shinawatras, and a handful of representatives of provincial factions and families that lend their electoral support to Pheu Thai, at least initially. The cabinet may also include new members driven by a progressive ideology and a welfare state agenda, drawn from the Move Forward Party (MFP). However, it is unlikely that the MFP’s push to amend Article 112 on royal defamation or to reform the military will be successful under Pheu Thai’s leadership. Pheu Thai may prefer to govern without further upsetting the Thai conservative establishment, especially with a Shinawatra scion as PM.

This government’s agenda will likely focus on policies aimed at stimulating the economy and improving the well-being of the grassroots and working class, who are the core supporters of Pheu Thai. However, such a government may also generate the greatest instability, especially if Paethongtharn becomes PM; the Shinawatra name alone is radioactive to conservatives. It is worth remembering that the 2014 military coup occurred under the Pheu Thai-led coalition government of Yingluck Shinawatra. Yingluck’s government precipitated paralysing street protests after attempting to ram through a comprehensive amnesty bill that could have facilitated Thaksin’s return to Thailand.

Finally, a ‘crossover’ scenario would involve the possible but often refuted combination of Pheu Thai and the PPRP, with other smaller parties such as Prachachat and Chartthaipattana, but excluding the MFP. Pheu Thai and the PPRP, two parties with supporters situated on opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, publicly denied the possibility that secret deals have been struck between Pheu Thai’s de facto leader-in-exile Thaksin and the PPRP’s leader General Prawit. However, it remains uncertain whether these parties will join hands in forming the next coalition government, considering Pheu Thai’s need to overrule or sway the Senate’s vote and the PPRP’s need for an ally that can produce a majority government.

General Prawit, who played a key role in selecting senators, has rebranded himself as a force for reconciliation. As part of an attempt to transform the PPRP into a vehicle for transcending the current political divide, Prawit recently declared that a Palang Pracharath government would set up a committee to select “the best of every political party’s policies” because “the politics that is in my heart is one where no one wins completely and no one loses totally”. Prawit’s underlying message is that the PPRP, under his leadership, is open to working with anyone regardless of ideological orientation. This includes Pheu Thai, which may need the PPRP’s support if it does not win by a sufficient margin.

If the crossover scenario occurs, Pheu Thai would likely control most cabinet portfolios, leaving a few key ministries, potentially significant ones such as the Interior, Defence, and the deputy prime minister position overseeing the Thai Police, to General Prawit. These concessions would serve as an internal check and balance on Pheu Thai’s dominance. Constitutional reform, specifically the amendment of Section 256 of the 2017 Constitution (governing constitutional amendments), would be more likely with General Prawit’s collaboration, as the support of at least one-third of the Senate is required. This could open the door to further democratic reforms.

Backroom dealing or a democratic choice?

It is too early to tell which of these configurations or other scenarios will come to pass. However, the policy pledges highlighted in each party’s platform will not directly determine these political configurations or translate into policy outcomes that accurately mirror Thai voters’ preferences. In short, Thailand’s current policy trajectory — already fragmented, incoherent, and fraught with instability stemming from intra-coalition rivalry — will continue. For now, however, the electorate does not seem to have much say. They can choose which party to support but they are unlikely to get what they vote for.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biographies

Napon Jatusripitak is a Visiting Fellow in the Thailand Studies Programme at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore. Ken Mathis Lohatepanont is a PhD student at the University of Michigan’s Department of Political Science. Image credit: Wikimedia/Tris_T7.

An earlier version of this article was published on Fulcrum.