New partners for the Indo-Pacific: Turkey-ASEAN relations amid increasing geopolitical uncertainties
New partnerS for the Indo-Pacific: Turkey-ASEAN relations amid increasing geopolitical uncertainties
WRITTEN BY DR SELÇUK ÇOLAKOĞLU
7 April 2025
In the aftermath of the Cold War, Ankara strategically cultivated strong ties with the newly independent nations in the wider Black Sea region and Central Asia to diversify its economic relations. Simultaneously, Ankara began to accentuate Turkey's Asian identity, complementing its European one. Turkish leaders frequently used the motto “The Turkic World; From the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China” in the 1990s to emphasise the historical and cultural connections of the Turkic people, which stretch from Europe to Asia. To this end, Ankara was instrumental in establishing two regional organisations: The Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS), both reflecting Turkey's Eurasian identity.
Ankara has also sought inclusion in other Asian groupings, such as being a dialogue partner in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and a sectoral dialogue partner of ASEAN. In 2019, the Turkish Foreign Ministry launched the "Asia Anew" initiative, identifying Southeast Asia as one of the critical economic regions that Ankara needs to engage with. The introduction of this initiative signifies a continued engagement with Asian countries, rather than a 'new' approach or an overall shift in Turkey's strategic orientation.
Historically, Turkey has upheld robust relationships with the Muslim-majority nations of Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei, through the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Despite the absence of robust political and economic integration, the OIC has served as a multilateral platform for leaders of Muslim-majority countries, primarily in Asia and Africa, to discuss a variety of issues regularly. Additionally, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines have evolved into significant regional trading partners for Turkey. Turkey's total trade volume with ASEAN members increased dramatically over two decades, from USD 1.1 billion in 2000 to USD 7.9 billion in 2020. In 1999, both Indonesia and Turkey emerged as representatives of developing economies within the G20. Further, in 2013, both countries, along with Australia, South Korea, and Mexico, established a forum known as MIKTA, uniting the middle powers within the G20.
As the economic centre of gravity shifts from the North Atlantic to the Pacific, Turkey's increasing emphasis on its Asian identity is a strategic move to benefit from the economic rise of East Asian countries and organisations.
Turkey's involvement with these organisations and forums facilitates the development of an institutional relationship with ASEAN. In an era of increasing uncertainties in both Asia and the world, strategic cooperation between developing middle powers in the Global South has become a necessity. This elevates the significance and relevance of Turkey-ASEAN relations.
Turkey’s assessment of the Sectoral Dialogue Partnership
The initiation of the Turkey-ASEAN Sectoral Dialogue Partnership presents a promising avenue to advance Ankara's goals in Southeast Asia. During the 43rd ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting (AMM) in Hanoi in 2010, Ankara signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). Later, in 2017, Turkey was granted Sectoral Dialogue Partner status by the 50th AMM in Manila. This is a significant step in Turkey's engagement with Southeast Asia, further strengthening its ties with the region.
The Sectoral Dialogue Partnership was institutionalised through the convening of the first ASEAN-Turkey Joint Sectoral Cooperation Committee (AT-JSCC) Meeting in 2018. Between 2018 and 2024, six AT-JSCC Meetings took place to shape the future direction of cooperation. The most recent Trilateral Meeting consisting of the ASEAN secretary, the host country Laos, and Turkey was held on the side-lines of the 57th AMM in Vientiane in July 2024. While the new list of Practical Cooperation Areas was conceived as a guide outlining priorities for engagement and cooperation between ASEAN and Turkey such as combating transnational crime and countering terrorism, good governance, human rights, trade, investment, sustainable development, etc. Ankara's ultimate objective in developing its relations with ASEAN is to achieve a "Dialogue Partnership", despite little indication that this will occur soon.
The economic relations between Turkey and Southeast Asian nations have indeed deepened over the past two decades. Turkey's total trade volume with all ASEAN members saw a significant increase from USD 1.1 billion in 2000 to a staggering USD 13.3 billion in 2022, before experiencing a slight dip to USD 13 billion in 2023.
However, when compared to ASEAN dialogue partners, Turkey's trade volume with Southeast Asian countries has remained relatively low, despite the potential for economic cooperation in the defence industry, particularly in areas such as armoured vehicles, weapon systems, armed drones, attack helicopters, tanks, and frigates. Ankara is keen to market its defence products in the region as a strategy to counterbalance its trade deficits with countries such as Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines.
Geopolitical aspects of Turkey-ASEAN cooperation
Turkey's unique geographical location at the intersection of Europe and Asia gives it a significant geostrategic advantage. Turkey has the potential to provide ASEAN countries with opportunities to develop close partnerships with both the leading economies of Europe and Eurasia, including Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. For instance, the BSEC and OTS could also foster institutional cooperation with ASEAN to facilitate further collaboration among their members. This can lead to a broadening and deepening of economic ties and cooperation in various sectors, including connectivity and energy projects. Leading Southeast Asian economies, which typically maintain secondary economic and political relations with Eurasian countries, have the potential to engage in mega projects either independently or through joint ventures with their Turkish counterparts.
As a member of NATO, Turkey has a close defence cooperation with the United States and leading European countries. Conversely, Turkey is also a partner in China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and has received significant Chinese investments. This unique position could be advantageous for ASEAN countries looking to strengthen their ties with both Western and Eastern powers. ASEAN harbours concerns regarding the escalating Sino-US strategic rivalry, particularly during the second Trump administration.
Indeed, Turkey, recognised as an emerging economy, has been increasingly influential in international organisations and forums. Ankara shares similar developmental concerns with ASEAN nations as part of the Global South. Therefore, collaboration could potentially strengthen ASEAN's position in the global arena, contributing to a more balanced and resilient Southeast Asia. Turkey's experience and expertise in humanitarian aid and development support could be shared with Southeast Asian nations, offering valuable insights and practical solutions for their development challenges.
Turkey's role as a facilitator or mediator in resolving existing disagreements among Southeast Asian countries is another significant aspect of its potential contribution. Turkey has already demonstrated its diplomatic capabilities as a member of the International Contact Group, alongside Japan, Saudi Arabia, and the UK, facilitating peace negotiations between the Philippines’ government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) since 2009. During its tenure as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2009 and 2010, Turkey played a crucial role in addressing the challenges faced by Timor-Leste, which achieved independence from Indonesia in 2002. From 2006 to 2012, Turkey's participation in the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) facilitated constructive political dialogue within the country and contributed to security sector reform. Furthermore, Ankara may also play a facilitative role in handling the Rohingya crisis between the Myanmar government and the country’s Muslim minority; it has already contributed over USD 60 million to support the Rohingya refugee camps established in Bangladesh.
On the security issues including maritime border disputes, Ankara has generally sought to steer clear of interstate conflicts in Southeast Asia. Turkey's neutrality on the maritime issues of Southeast Asia, including the South China Sea dispute, is indeed a strategic choice. Given its longstanding maritime disputes with Greece and its non-participation in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Ankara has a vested interest in maintaining a neutral stance on similar issues elsewhere. This neutrality could potentially be beneficial for ASEAN countries as it allows Turkey to act as an unbiased mediator in regional maritime disputes.
Future perspectives
ASEAN holds a pivotal role in the Indo-Pacific region, both as an economic hub and a key player in various regional forums and agreements. These include the ASEAN Regional Forum, Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the East Asian Summit, ASEAN Plus Three, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) — the world's largest free trade agreement. A closer relationship with ASEAN could provide Ankara with access to the dynamic markets of Asia, foster economic collaborations, and enable participation in regional initiatives.
The strategic location of Southeast Asia, nestled among the world's largest economies — the United States, China, Japan, and India — offers Turkey a unique opportunity to strengthen its economic and institutional ties not only with ASEAN but also with these major powers. As the economic centre of gravity shifts from the North Atlantic to the Pacific, Turkey's increasing emphasis on its Asian identity is a strategic move to benefit from the economic rise of East Asian countries and organisations. Deepening relations with ASEAN will likely provide Ankara further engagements in the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific has increasingly emerged as a global economic hub, while also presenting nested geopolitical challenges. Robust institutional involvement with ASEAN offers Ankara new opportunities in this mega-region. Furthermore, a solid strategic cooperation between Turkey and ASEAN will enable the bloc to extend its reach to Eurasia.
The Liberal International Order, which primarily relies on Western-led economic globalisation, entered a period of serious turbulence following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Both global growth and world trade began to stagnate, leading to a new turning point for economic globalisation as we know it. Economic globalisation is likely to face even greater turmoil during the second Trump presidency. Furthermore, international organisations such as the UN and the World Trade Organisation may encounter existential crises.
In an era of increasing uncertainties in both Asia and the world, developing middle powers in the Global South need to enhance their strategic cooperation. All ASEAN members have limited economic and political capabilities, making them vulnerable to the politics of great powers. Although Turkey's economic relations with ASEAN are not as intense as those with other main non-member partners, a “dialogue partnership” could provide the organisation with new strategic advantages through Turkey. Ankara's participation in ASEM and the ASEAN Regional Forum could also stimulate strategic cooperation between Turkey and Southeast Asian nations.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Dr Selçuk Çolakoğlu is the Founding Director of the Turkish Centre for Asia-Pacific Studies (APAC) in Ankara, Turkey. He also serves as a faculty member and the coordinator of the Globalisation and Development Programme at Beijing Normal — Hong Kong Baptist University (BNBU). Image credit: Wikimedia Commons/Mstyslav Chernov.