In Conversation with Dr. Enze Han
21 November 2024
9DASHLINE’s Southeast Asia Associate, Hunter Marston, recently interviewed Dr. Enze Han about his latest book, The Ripple Effect: China’s Complex Presence in Southeast Asia.
The book provides a nuanced perspective on China’s relationship with Southeast Asia, focusing not just on state-level interactions but also on the significant role of non-state actors, such as businesses and migrants, in shaping regional perceptions of China. It delves into the multifaceted nature of Chinese influence, examining challenges like coordination, principal-agent dynamics, and the varying degrees of local acceptance.
HM: In the book you present a variegated picture of China’s influence in Southeast Asia, from the official state-to-state level of interactions to those of China’s diaspora community across the region. What is the main lesson you would like the reader to take away from the book?
EH: I think the main lesson I would like readers to take away from the book is the complexity of China’s presence for Southeast Asia as a result of its geographic proximity and the size of its population and economy. That means, historically and contemporarily, the interactions between actors coming out from China have been the most intensive with Southeast Asia; for example, the long history of Chinese migration to the region, Cold War China’s support for communist insurgencies in the region, as well as current integrated trading relations between the two. The bilateral relationship is multidimensional and perhaps very difficult to measure using a simplistic quantitative matrix. Rather we should view bilateral relations holistically as an extremely entangled one.
HM: You emphasise that we should be careful not to assume a state’s (here China’s) stated goal is the same as its underlying intention. What in your view is Beijing’s main goal in Southeast Asia? How does it differ from official rhetoric as Chinese officials present it in speeches and joint communiques?
EH: What I try to emphasise is that we cannot necessarily infer the Chinese state’s intention towards Southeast Asia from its public statements. The official rhetoric from China is the talking points about good neighbourly relations etc, and is usually quite difficult to decipher. In my view, Beijing’s main goal in Southeast Asia is to have its interests respected by Southeast Asian governments, and that would mean imposing its views on territorial disputes in the South China Sea, having a region that is overall at least neutral towards the US-China competition, and having economic benefits through regional trade and economic integration. However, many non-state actors from China, such as corporations, petty businesses, and even criminal networks, do not necessarily share the same goals with the Chinese state. For the most part, many are trying to get away from the Chinese state’s monitoring of them, and usually have an economic logic to their actions.
HM: You describe Thailand’s domestic institutions as “conduits of Chinese influence”. However authoritarian governments in countries such as Cambodia and Myanmar have accused domestic civil society organisations of operating at the behest of Western countries like the United States. How is Beijing’s influence in Southeast Asia unique?
EH: I think this is the process for how influence from any country is achieved in the sense that there is a need for domestic actors to facilitate such influence. That’s why I put a lot of emphasis on the agency of Southeast Asian governments and society actors. It is ultimately through them that foreign influence — be it from the US or China — is channelled. As a result, when looking at Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, we have to pay attention to the interests of certain domestic actors.
HM: You have a lot of expertise on Myanmar, where you have conducted extensive research and have called for Beijing to work with Myanmar’s opposition National Unity Government to restore democratic stability. Based on Beijing’s support for the Myanmar military junta and other authoritarian governments in Southeast Asia, is there a realistic chance the CCP would choose this path?
EH: I am overall disappointed by Beijing’s lack of vision towards Myanmar’s domestic politics because it was my hope that Beijing would understand public sentiments in the country better before calibrating approaches towards both the NUG and the SAC. I still don’t think Beijing is going to exclude working with the NUG eventually when the signs are clearer, but it seems currently they have settled for working with the SAC as the most likely partner that is in de facto control of the country’s core.
HM: You note there has been little to no intergovernmental response to crack down on cyber scam operations in Cambodia or Myanmar, which tend to be operated by Chinese criminal syndicates. More recently, however, Beijing has coordinated with various stakeholders in Myanmar, including ethnic armed groups, to eradicate cyber scam compounds that have detained Chinese citizens. Could this precedent lead to greater international cooperation on this front?
EH: I wrote the book before the Chinese government decided to work with a few rebel groups to crack down on the criminal networks in Myanmar. But I think overall my assessment is correct in the sense that there is an asymmetry of interests between China and various Southeast Asian countries. This is because the victims of these cyber scam criminal networks are mostly within China, and I suspect there is substantial corruption and collusion between Southeast Asian political elites and these criminal networks for economic benefits. That’s why international cooperation on this issue has been lacking; in the case of some of the rebel groups in Myanmar, these are the entities upon whom Chinese pressure can genuinely come to bear, but this might not be the case with the majority of Southeast Asian governments.
HM: You contend that the degree to which home states securitise their Chinese diaspora populations depends on their threat perceptions of China. However, many states with large ethnic Chinese communities such as Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia tend to have low threat perceptions regarding China. Could you expand on that relationship?
EH: My argument is that if there is a low threat perception of China, then there is going to be less securitisation of Chinese diaspora relations with China in certain Southeast Asian countries. That’s why in countries such as Thailand, the ethnic Chinese are not securitised because of the lack of public threat perception towards China. On the other hand, I think in countries such as Myanmar where there is a high threat perception towards China, there is a constant securitisation of the ethnic Chinese and their complicated relations with China.
HM: You end on a rather sobering note regarding China’s competition for influence in Southeast Asia, referring to the 2023 State of Southeast Asia survey by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, which found a growing majority of respondents indicating that they would choose the United States over China if forced to choose sides. However, the most recent survey results show China slightly outperforming the United States with 50.5 to 49.5 per cent respectively. How are we to make sense of the current state of US-China competition?
EH: I think the most recent State of Southeast Asia’s results are not because of what China did to the region. Rather, it reflects the US’s actions in the Middle East, which have significantly soured its image in countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia. This means we should not think of alignment choices in Southeast Asia as one-dimensional — in fact, they are not. There are many issue linkages that affect people’s views of China and the United States. With the intensification of conflict in the Middle East, US foreign policy will be tilted more towards that region, which will have repercussions for its image in Southeast Asia. Now with the election of Donald Trump for the second term, I think his foreign policy will be even more tied towards the Middle East with further backing of Israel. Similarly, other Southeast Asian countries might perceive the lack of US commitment to the region as well.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Biography
Enze Han is Associate Professor at the Department of Politics and Public Administration, The University of Hong Kong. His recent publications include Asymmetrical Neighbors: Borderland State Building between China and Southeast Asia (Oxford University Press, 2019), and Contestation and Adaptation: The Politics of National Identity in China (Oxford University Press, 2013). Dr. Han received his Ph.D. in Political Science from George Washington University, and he was also a postdoctoral research fellow in the China and the World Program at Princeton University.