In conversation with Dr T.V. Paul
19 September 2024
9DASHLINE recently had the pleasure of speaking with Dr T.V. Paul about his recent book: The Unfinished Quest: India’s Search for Major Power Status from Nehru to Modi.
The book explores India's successes and constraints since its independence in 1947, analysing the motivations of its leaders and the benchmarks for global status. Paul highlights India's ongoing challenges in attaining great power status, particularly in relation to China, and discusses the evolving power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region. He also emphasises India's potential as a "swing power" and its ability to harness its demographic dividend in the face of China's rise.
This book offers a comprehensive analysis of India's role in the contemporary global order.
9DL: You observe that the China-India rivalry has worsened since Xi and Modi took office. Why do you think this is the case?
TVP: On multiple fronts a noticeable decline in Sino-Indian relations is visible since 2014. The territorial conflict that was frozen for over four decades became alive once again particularly in 2017, 2020 and 2022, with many clashes along the disputed areas of their 4,056-kilometer border. The relationship between the two leaders also became challenging as the personal affinity between them almost vanished after a few initial meetings.
China and India used to take common positions in global institutions and had worked together to create new institutions such as the BRICS grouping and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), but cooperation through these institutions also seems to have declined. India's nonparticipation in the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the free trade grouping in East Asia, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), has affected cooperation on the economic front. Although trade relations are still continuing, the balance of trade is heavily in China’s favour due to its higher levels of exports to India, especially industrial components.
9DL: Your book traces India’s quest for major power status since the country’s independence. What kind of power does India want to be? Has India aspired to be a different kind of power at different stages/under different leaders?
TVP: It is clear from the evidence I present in the book that India has been seeking a leading role in international politics since 1947. The first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, thought India could become a leader of the newly emerging developing countries largely through normative power, seeking changes in international power structures through institutional and legal means as well as active diplomacy at the United Nations. In 1955, India spearheaded the Bandung meeting of some 55 newly emerged Asian and African states, and then the non-aligned movement since the early 1960s, which was formed to serve as a third force in international politics. However, this proved to be challenging to sustain.
India’s violent conflict with China over the Himalayan borders and its defeat in the 1962 war caused serious challenges to Nehru’s strategy. Under Indira Gandhi, India turned to a more realpolitik approach, especially with respect to Pakistan and nuclear weapons. Her goal to gain a prominent position in South Asia was constrained by regional developments, especially the US-led war in Afghanistan against the Taliban. The liberalisation of the Indian economy since 1991 and the US desire to cultivate India as a swing power helped India calibrate to the status of a rising power from an aspirational power. So, today the BJP-led government seeks traditional great power status, focusing on India's military and economic achievements and a leading role in international institutions.
9DL: How do the historical strategies employed by India in its quest for major power status, particularly those under Nehru and Indira Gandhi, compare with the approaches taken by other rising powers like China and Japan? What lessons can India draw from these comparisons?
TVP: Rising powers such as China and Japan have traditionally focused their attention on emulating Western powers. Japan wanted to modernise first, and the Meiji restoration of 1868 was intended to help become a Western-like great power, both in economic and military terms. China is pursuing somewhat of a similar policy. Under Mao, it pursued a revolutionary method but later turned to a balance-of-power approach by joining hands with the US to challenge the Soviet Union. Then under Deng Xiaoping and his successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, China massively improved its economic and military strength. Today under Xi Jinping, China is aggressively pursuing the goal of becoming a global power, replacing the US as the lead power by the mid-21st century.
Both Japan and China worked on improving their domestic economic and social conditions and uplifting poor people to a sustainable economic position. India’s efforts are a bit haphazard on both fronts. It has been focusing on traditional power resources, especially under Modi with a lot of emphasis on overall economic growth in terms of GDP numbers. This is a weak approach because, with huge problems related to human development and infrastructure, India has not been able to attain the lead role aspired by the elite and the middle class. Unlike China, through the decades, India devoted insufficient resources to human development, especially education and health care, as well as infrastructure and this has slowed down India’s trajectory. Although India is now gradually acquiring some of these capabilities, the question is how fast and how soon these improvements can be made and whether they will be able to balance the rise of China in the Indo-Pacific in the years to come.
9DL: In what ways did the COVID-19 pandemic expose India’s weaknesses, and how have these revelations influenced domestic policy and international perceptions of India as a rising power?
TVP: COVID-19 affected all states across the world. India was more exposed given the high levels of poverty and the state’s inability to offer healthcare and economic support quickly to the masses, producing a large number of deaths. The immense suffering of the migrant populations exposed India's weaknesses and the inability to deal with a crisis of this magnitude especially in the first round of the Covid outbreak in 2020, although during the second round in 2022, India fared better and was more prepared in some ways. As the largest producer of cheap vaccines, India’s vaccine diplomacy gave it a bit of a status boost internationally, especially in Africa. This crisis may well be a precursor to other catastrophes, especially relating to climate change and global warming, and the question is whether India is prepared to face these situations and act pre-emptively rather than reactively.
9DL: How can or should India achieve its global aspirations while many regional issues remain unresolved and its regional status continues to be contested?
TVP: Not all leading states have become great powers after resolving all their regional issues or completely dominating their neighbourhood, especially in the modern era. Today, domination of a region is very difficult even for China because smaller states are reluctant to accept dominant state hegemony in their region. So, regional hegemony as well as spheres of influence that great powers in the past achieved will not be feasible, especially in South Asia. However, various regional conflicts and regional challenges can drag India down as it has to divert its military, economic, and social capacities to those issues rather than focus on the global arena.
The challenge also is that China has entered the South Asian region in a big way and smaller states have the capacity now to bargain with both and seek assistance from each. However, none of the smaller states can afford to alienate India for too long. India has abandoned the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) mechanism, and this is also a challenge because without institutional forums India cannot offer an effective leadership role for solving many of the collective action problems in the region. The other challenge is that the domestic politics of smaller states in South Asia often produce outcomes that are not aligned with India’s interests. The recent elections in Bangladesh and Maldives produced results that were not in India's favour and this will continue given that the smaller states have a tendency to play off India and China.
9DL: In chapter five, you mention that 'India has an opportunity to elevate itself as a key ally of the Western powers and a swing state given the widening rivalry in US-China relations. However, with China's emergence as India's biggest trading partner in 2023, what strategies would you advise the West, particularly the US, to adopt to bolster India's hard power and strengthen their bilateral ties in effectively addressing the challenges posed by China?
TVP: There have been serious ups and downs in US-India relations in recent years as India wants to be a pole in a multipolar system and it has been seeking a multi-alignment strategy to keep its relations intact with Russia hoping to prevent a Sino-Russian alliance. India does not want deep polarisation in the international system or a bipolar-type Cold War because it wants to avoid taking sides. It wants to keep its options open, with the hope that it will become a third force in the years to come.
This strategy has some short-term challenges especially as it is unclear whether Washington views India as a swing power anymore and if India is deemed a credible partner. Much diplomatic effort is needed on both sides for India to assist US security goals without losing its strategic autonomy, the US to help India in the economic and technological arenas as well as build a naval capacity for India that could challenge China’s powerful naval buildup in the South China Sea. A strong and determined India with a strong navy is needed, especially in the Indian Ocean to prevent China from acquiring regional and global dominance in the years to come.
9DL: Given the rise of Hindu nationalism under the BJP and its impact on India’s secular credentials, how do you see this domestic shift affecting India’s international relations and its quest for great power status?
TVP: As I argue in the book, India's soft power is built around liberal principles such as democracy, secularism, and tolerance of different cultures and religions. The BJP's idea of a Hindu Rashtra is unlikely to succeed in India considering the large number of minorities, especially Muslims, who are a big part of India's story so far. International status is in the perceptions of others and so far, Hindutva has not really elevated India's position among any states of significance and so it's unclear how this ideology can elevate India’s international status.
Nationalism, based on identity politics, can sometimes increase the elites’ determination and may produce stronger capacity building in both military and economic readiness. However, India's position as a soft power-dominant state needs to be calibrated and liberal democracy and secularism are absolutely essential to differentiate India from other rising powers, particularly China. If India loses its democratic credentials, it will have a difficult time legitimising its power position and status ranking in the years to come, especially in the West.
9DL: With China’s aggressive strategies in the Indo-Pacific and its influence through initiatives like the Belt and Road, how do you envision India’s strategic response evolving? What role do you see for alliances like the Quad in countering China’s dominance?
TVP: BRI is a challenge to India although so far it has only been partially successful as a geoeconomic strategy. Despite many plans to counter it, India has been focusing on bilateral trade and economic arrangements which have limitations. This is an area where the US, India, Japan, and Southeast Asian countries can cooperate with a counter-BRI approach, combining all the developmental programs they have and preventing China’s domination in the years to come. This may not be easy, but it is worth trying, especially in Africa where China has been making inroads and India has some traditional strengths. Southeast Asia is also very critical for India's development and US interests.
How to challenge Chinese moves remains a big problem for India and the limited soft balancing mechanism with Washington at this point is yet to evolve as a military alliance. This could change if China becomes more aggressive and initiates a war on Taiwan or Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam. This will also pose a serious challenge to India as to whether it wants to be a direct participant in these conflicts or offer only indirect support. India must develop plans in the event of conflict and war in the region and to prevent an escalation of such conflicts to India's northern border with China and Western border with Pakistan as well as naval conflicts in the Indian Ocean region.
Given these strategic theatres are heavily dependent on the actions of others, India not only has to develop different contingency plans and strategies but also strengthen its domestic capacity, improve its human development, and make the most of its demographic dividend. For all this to happen India needs peace internally and externally, and to employ active diplomacy in both the regional and global spheres.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Biography
Dr T.V. Paul is Distinguished James McGill Professor in the Department of Political Science at McGill University, Montreal, Canada and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. He is the Founding Director of the Global Research Network on Peaceful Change (GRENPEC). Paul is the author or editor of 24 books, co-editor of 4 special journal issues, and author of over 85 scholarly articles/book chapters in the fields of International Relations, International Security, and South Asia. For more, see www.tvpaul.com.