Burmese blowback: Prayuth’s myopic Myanmar policy

18 May 2021

No one has ever accused Thai Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-Ocha of being a brilliant strategic thinker. His policies have always tended to be reactive or short-term. So, his government’s immediate endorsement of the 1 February coup d’etat in Myanmar was no surprise; it made short-term political sense.

The two are obviously ideologically simpatico. The Thai government is itself borne of a coup d’etat. And indeed, Prayuth appeared to offer the Tatmadaw his gradual model for consolidating their power while nominally returning power to civilians. This included a long transition period, disqualifying parties and opposition figures, gerrymandering, malapportioning the vote, appointing voting blocs within parliament (including the entire upper house), establishing proportional representation, and using a slew of vague and draconian laws to quell dissent and restrict civil society.

Yet, things are fundamentally different in Myanmar where, after decades of military rule that ran the economy into the ground, the people have liberalised the economy, lifting tens of millions of people out of abject poverty, and reentered the global economy and community of nations. For 10 years, an entire generation has grown up online with social media, and a relatively free press. But most of all, they had hope. Their courage in standing up to the bloodthirsty Tatmadaw is awe-inspiring.

Myanmar might not be a failed state yet, but it is teetering towards becoming one. And the capture of the state by EAOs and transnational syndicates will impact Thai security for years to come.

The Tatmadaw has been at war with its population since the country’s founding in 1948. There’s never been a time when the military has not been fighting one or more ethnic armed organisations (EAOs). And the Tatmadaw has never fought a population-centric counterinsurgency campaign, trying to win hearts and minds. Their doctrine is based on a scorched earth policy, meant to terrorise the population into submission. Within 100 days, the Tatmadaw had killed nearly 800 people and arrested or detained well over 4,000. It had removed the heart of one poet, tortured to death, to terrorise the population. It is unlikely that the Thai military would ever use the degree of violence against its population as the Tatmadaw does with complete impunity. And that scares Prayuth.

Domestic challenges

The Thai government faces a host of challenges and its legitimacy is flagging. In mid-2020, student-led demonstrations erupted and quickly spread across the country. The general public, hard hit by the sharp economic contraction caused by the collapse of the tourism industry, joined in the civil disobedience movement. In response, the government stepped up the use of Lese Majeste charges to quell dissent.

The economy contracted by an estimated 8 per cent in 2020 and this trend continued in the first quarter of 2021. Today, Thailand is besmirched with its highest infection rates (now at 88,000 cases, up from a mere 7,000 in January) amidst a slow vaccine rollout, in part tied to a royal-family owned firm with no experience in vaccine production. Although the prime minister consolidated a host of powers in April to cope with the pandemic, the situation has only worsened.

The Thai government is obviously watching developments in neighbouring Myanmar closely. The resolve of the civil disobedience movement there should give the Thai government pause as it could clearly embolden Thai protesters. On 12 May, a Thai court finally granted bail to a leading democracy activist who had been on a hunger strike in jail for the past few weeks. He had been denied bail on ten occasions since his February arrest, and it is clear that the regime fears his death would catalyse a new round of protests.

Compounded by the Myanmar Coup

Thailand’s domestic ills will only be compounded by the spill-over from Myanmar. We will see this in three distinct ways. First, the floodgates of illicit narcotics will be opened. The UNODC has been documenting a surge in synthetic drugs such as methamphetamines in the region. Between 2011 and 2020, there was a 640 per cent increase, as global syndicates flocked to Myanmar’s borderlands. Many of the chemicals and their precursors are lawfully traded and flow through Thailand.

Today, Thailand is being completely inundated by illicit drugs. It is not surprising to see one or two stories a week about large seizures of illegal narcotics; millions of tablets of methamphetamine are seized at a time. And sadly, that is just the tip of the iceberg; these raids are often what the drug syndicates allow the authorities to discover, or tipoffs about their rivals’ activities, in order to keep their shipments going.

We are likely to see certain EAO‘s that have sided with the opposition and the exiled National Unity Government (NUG) increase their production of narcotics to fund their armed campaigns against the government. At the same time, we are likely to see the Tatmadaw cut deals with certain EAOs to defect from the NUG. Usually, the Myanmar military has done this by allowing EAOs control over the narcotics trade, with the Tatmadaw getting their share of the proceeds. And while the UNODC, has documented a steady decline in opiates and heroin from Myanmar, this trend could reverse as the country’s rural economy continues to crater and people search for alternative livelihoods. And there is still a market for these drugs.

The international syndicates that produce synthetic drugs in Myanmar’s borderlands benefit from the pervasive insecurity and lack of rule of law. They have a vested interest in maintaining this status quo and will only become more entrenched. This regional or sub-state ‘capture' bodes poorly for Thailand over the long term. These groups are very well-financed and resourced; they will be hard to dislodge. Thailand’s loyalty to the Burmese junta is not going to be repaid in anything but a surge of illegal narcotics for years to come.

Second, Thailand itself will be targeted by the Tatmadaw. While the Tatmadaw has no intention of picking a fight with Thailand, it is also not showing much restraint in targeting EAOs and their civilian supporters crossing into Thailand. The Thai government has said little about these attacks even though they put Thai citizens in harm’s way, and Bangkok has had to evacuate entire villages. As the conflict drags on, more people will be crossing into Thailand, which despite pledges of protection, has forcibly returned refugees, and quietly cooperated with the Tatmadaw.

Third, the collapse of the Burmese economy will lead to a flood of migrants, not just refugees. It is hard to state just how deleterious the coup has been for Myanmar’s economy. The first 100 days of the coup have wiped out 10 years of progress in poverty alleviation. Foreign investment has fled, overseas assistance has dried up, sanctions have kicked in, and the civil disobedience movement has shut down large sectors of the economy, including the banking sector. A recent UNDP study said the economy was “reaching the point of collapse”, found that 83 per cent of households indicated a drop in income, and expected that 48.2 per cent of the population, i.e. 26 million people, will live in poverty. The government will burn through its limited hard currency supply trying to defend the kyat, which is in free fall. The World Bank is already predicting a 10 per cent contraction in the economy this year, while different rating agencies are predicting up to a 20 per cent contraction.

While Thailand can easily absorb migrants from Myanmar when its economy is growing, its economy continues to contract. Thailand’s economic weakness is compounded by huge disparities in wealth. To make matters worse, the coup has completely unended Myanmar’s vaccine rollout. Bordering India, where the world’s largest surge of COVID-19 has spawned a new and very contagious variant, Myanmar is likely to become a vector for the further spread of the disease into Thailand. This will further weaken the Thai economy, and potentially cause instability as the public scapegoats' migrants.

This ain’t Vegas, baby

What happens in Myanmar will not stay in Myanmar and Thailand’s military-backed junta has been slow to realise this. The Tatmadaw has shown the Thais the extent that they are willing to go to cling to power, at the expense of their economy, rule of law, and educational system. Myanmar might not be a failed state yet, but it is teetering towards becoming one. And the capture of the state by EAOs and transnational syndicates will impact Thai security for years to come. Thailand has a role to play here. It could join the other ASEAN states that have taken a harder line on the junta. It could demand that the junta implement the 5-point proposal that it agreed to, and immediately ignored, stalling for time. But it won’t. Thailand will hide behind ASEAN’s principle of non-interference.

The military-backed government in Thailand sees fellow travellers in Naypyidaw. Their back channel to the junta will be used not to pressure the regime, but to ensure that the Tatmadaw will defend Thailand’s steady supply of natural gas. It will be used to provide the Tatmadaw with a Thai-style roadmap for normalisation. The problems in Myanmar are not going to be contained and will spill over and impact Thailand for years to come. Tactical victories? Sure, but the strategic losses are Prayuth’s.

DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.

Author biography

Zachary Abuza is a Professor at the National War College in Washington, DC, where he teaches Southeast Asian politics & security. The views expressed here are his own and not represent the National WarCollege, Department of Defence, or the US Government. Image credit: Wikimedia.