Afghanistan continues to pose a traditional and non-traditional security threat
Afghanistan continues to pose a traditional and non-traditional security threat
WRITTEN BY NILOFAR SAKHI
22 October 2021
Twenty years after 9/11 and the start of the Global War on Terror, Afghanistan continues to pose both traditional and non-traditional security threats. While the purpose of the war in Afghanistan was to prevent the country from becoming a haven for Salafi terrorist groups like al-Qaida, the recent Taliban take-over and return to power once again positions the country to become a haven for Islamist organisations to re-emerge and re-organise. The Taliban’s takeover also creates conditions for a largescale socio-economic crisis that will no doubt lead to frustration, aggression, and insurgency in Afghanistan. There are many reasons we should be concerned about the events unfolding in Afghanistan. Four key factors can help better understand what has contributed to and is likely to exacerbate the threats posed by and to Afghanistan.
The financial sources of terrorism
One imperative approach for dismantling transnational terrorist organisations is the need to eradicate their financial sources. The counterterrorism strategy becomes moot when the financial sources are not dismantled. Some security scholars and practitioners argue that the Taliban are critical of al-Qaida and have no operational relationship with its leaders. However, reports available in the public domain highlight that the Taliban never fully cut their ties with al-Qaida. If the Taliban faces increasingly negative economic conditions in governing Afghanistan, they will most certainly look to further build a closer relationship with al-Qaida and other jihadist groups operating in the region.
This needs-based relationship means that the Taliban will offer a haven to al-Qaida in exchange for financial support. Other financial sources — based in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirate and Qatar — along with taxation systems and the illegal drug trade, have all helped to sustain the Taliban insurgency in the twenty years since it was ousted from Kabul. According to a report, the drug trade accounts for up to 60 per cent of the Taliban’s annual revenue.
As the Taliban increases its stronghold and gains more territory and power, it will become a serious transnational threat. Radicalisation, the emergence of new terrorist groups, and arms trafficking will likely increase, adding to local security threats.
The Taliban have multiple ways of profiting from the drug trade including attracting tribal chiefs with opium trade ties and supporting the transnational drug networks to receive contributions to strengthen their regime. In partnership with al-Qaida’s leadership during the Taliban regime from 1996-2001, they worked to move drugs out and money into Afghanistan, like other insurgent and extremist organisations operating along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In the past, the Taliban utilised the drug money for their operational costs. Instead of breaking up those drug networks, the Taliban are more likely to further strengthen them for economic gains and have an alternative to sustain their regime in case they do not have international funding. Unfortunately, none of these issues have been addressed strategically to counter terrorism effectively and sustainably.
Inspiration for jihadists
Second, the Taliban’s return to power has inspired jihadists to rally around their global mission to expand their territorial and ideological war. Pakistan and Bangladesh are likely to be the first countries in the region to be affected by the Taliban’s victory. The Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan or TTP), which has made explicit threats to attack the West in the past, will be inspired by the Afghan Taliban’s victory and seek to expand its areas of influence inside Pakistan and across the region.
Islamic Fundamentalists in Bangladesh are particularly attracted to the Taliban's ideology and have used it to rationalise their behaviour. For example, Jamaatul Mujahidin Bangladesh (JMB) an indigenous terrorist group committed to establishing an Islamic State through violence has long aimed to establish a Taliban-style government in Bangladesh by force. The Taliban takeover in Afghanistan also encourages Jihadi groups — al-Shabab in Somalia, al-Nusra in Syria, ISIS, and al-Qaida — which are predicted to expand their outreach, build their networks, and in some cases build alliances with other smaller insurgent groups. The Taliban’s victory could re-energise al-Qaida, the Islamic State, and others to further expand their power and ideology and carry out terror attacks, which have been in decline since 2017.
On the other hand, the Taliban victory may inspire new groups and create a war of attrition in parts of countries like Tajikistan that have a weak governance system and where state oppression seemed to have provoked some violent incidents in the past. As reports highlight, violent extremism and insurgency exist in Tajikistan, and their causes rooted in Tajik-state-society relations might increase the potential for violent Islamic extremism. For instance, some areas have not benefitted from economic development and grievances against the local government are high. In such a context the Islamist groups will try to undermine the governments' abilities and legitimacy by exerting their influence on people and by creating instability. These Islamist groups also offer resources to deprived populations who are not satisfied with the central government services and operations. Eventually, these actions will play into the current momentum among insurgent groups across the country who want to expand their territorial and ideological fights.
A socio-economic crisis
Afghanistan’s economy has long been dependent on international funding and, according to the World Bank, about 40 per cent of its gross domestic product (GDP) comes from international aid. This lifeline of foreign aid has dried up since the Taliban takeover, and the uncertainty of future funding — in addition to COVID-19, drought, corruption, and a highly centralised government — has caused a severe humanitarian crisis. Other factors impacting this crisis include the irregular banking system and strict withdrawal limits, the halting of development programs, shuttered businesses, and the lack of a regulatory framework at border crossings due to closed borders. Trade has been severely disrupted and political instability and security issues have also created major impediments to business investments. Health and food insecurity, combined with the burgeoning economic crisis and lack of basic social services are among the list of people's growing grievances.
A scarcity of US dollars has quickly affected the value of the Afghani currency. Just before the fall of Kabul, the Afghani was valued at 80 Afghani to 1 USD; the current value of 93-95 Afghani to 1 USD has resulted in steep inflation of goods and services, making everyday necessities unaffordable to the general population. With the sinking currency and rising inflation, more than a third of the population lives on less than 2 USD per day, leaving many Afghans to suffer widespread hunger which has been exacerbated by severe societal trauma. The Taliban is also depriving women of work and education, which could further add to poverty and have a major effect on people’s livelihoods. Afghans can either resist or decide to flee the country as economic and political migrants. The major risk is that a mass exodus of people and widespread dislocation. This could increase the probability of people joining the insurgency or participating in the illegal drug trade to ensure a source of income to feed their families.
Local grievances exacerbated
The Taliban lacks an inclusive policy to bring a diverse representation of people — from different backgrounds, skillsets, expertise, and ideology — into the composition of the government. Atrocities such as suppressing women’s rights, detaining and beating journalists, warning protesters, and imposing strict rules are some of the major and significant concerns that people have. This situation shadowed the lives of the progressive men and women who cannot resume their daily routines, practice their values, or express their views freely and without fear. The rights-based and intellectual communities have already started resisting the Taliban’s regime that imposes hard rules on women by stopping them from working, and by excluding them from government and politics.
The weeks since the Taliban’s takeover have already negatively impacted the mental health of the population. Feelings of hopelessness and fear run high, leading to a mass migration of educated, progressive populations, who cannot imagine a future in Afghanistan for themselves and their children. The absence of the country’s educated, progressive, reformers will enable radicalised ideologies to emerge, nourish, and take root. This will lead the society to gradually normalise radical thinking, behaviour, and attitudes, making the conditions ripe to fight against those who are different.
Increased risk of terrorism under the Taliban’s control
The Taliban's interim government is demonstrating the reality of life and rule under Taliban control. The government is now void of women, ethnic groups and minorities, and their representatives have been replaced by the Taliban's old guard and hardliners, including members of the Haqqani network — the most brutal faction within the Taliban. These characteristics of the Taliban’s leadership increases the chances of Afghanistan becoming a haven that allows Islamist terrorist groups to emerge and reorganise. Meanwhile, human rights abuses and harsh rule on the population have reiterated the threat the Taliban could pose to Afghan's civil and political rights, stoking grievances and leading to intensified frustration and aggression. The Taliban government has also drastically reduced the chances of legitimate recognition by the international community, which will most likely result in the loss of funding and exacerbate an already dire humanitarian and economic crisis.
Eventually, the Taliban will be forced to return to their most sustainable source of income: drug money. The drug trade has been key to the Taliban's long-standing existence and operational support. Renewed reliance on the drug trade will mean the Taliban will strengthen their ties with drug networks both inside and outside Afghanistan. As the Taliban increases its stronghold and gains more territory and power, it will become a serious transnational threat. Radicalisation, the emergence of new terrorist groups, and arms trafficking will likely increase, adding to local security threats. Further fragmentation of society, along with multiple other factors — poverty, poor governance, Taliban atrocities, and its authoritarian system — will cause political instability and increase the probability of insurgency. The resulting violence, poor governance, arms trafficking, and instability will allow the extremists a greater chance to seize power and increase the likelihood of security threats locally, regionally, and globally.
DISCLAIMER: All views expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of the 9DASHLINE.com platform.
Author biography
Dr Nilofar Sakhi is the director of policy and diplomacy at McColm & Company, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center. Image credit: Flickr/李 季霖.